Several factors contributed to tragic outcome at Bruckless Pier, report finds

An investigation by the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) into the tragic death of a boat owner at Bruckless Pier has resulted in a number of safety recommendations being made. 

Eamon McNern of Castleview, Dunkineely had gone to the pier to remove his boat from the water on September 28, 2023. His remains were found a short time later after a fellow boat owner noticed a capsized tender dinghy beside Mr McNern’s moored motor boat. 

The report by the MCIB was published on August 28, 2024. Recommendations include awareness campaigns relating to the law surrounding the wearing of personal flotation devices (PFDs), the increased risks of operating a vessel alone, and the importance of correct training and risk management assessment for powerboat operators. 

The investigation found the casualty was alone in his vessel and this incident was not witnessed by

anyone else. He had intended to remove his boat from the water with the help of a family member who he was due to meet at 6.45pm.  

He visited the pier several times during the day but returned home by 3.30pm. 

According to the report: “The casualty’s movements between 3.30pm and 4.30pm are unknown but at

some stage during this one-hour period he returned to Bruckless Pier and launched his dinghy tender to go out to his motor boat again.”

Tragedy Strikes

The MCIB report outlines that at 4.30pm, another boat owner arrived at the pier to check on his own motor

boat as there were strong winds blowing. 

“He noticed that there was a capsized dinghy tender alongside the casualty’s motor boat,” the report reads. 

The boat owner put on his own PFD, launched in another dinghy tender and rowed out to the casualty’s motor boat.

According to the report: “The conditions were very challenging for him. He initially tried to approach the

motor boat from upwind, but was blown downwind behind the boat. He struggled to row back up against the wind and swell.”

On boarding the motor boat, he noticed that there was nobody onboard, the engine was running in idle; and the boat hook was loose on the deck.

Shortly after this, he saw the casualty’s body on the surface of the water between the boat and the shore. 

Struggling with the windy conditions, the man managed to cut lines attaching the capsized dinghy tender to the motor boat. 

He untied the casualty’s motor boat mooring and drove it to the shore to take onboard a person who had come to the pier to help. Together, they retrieved the casualty’s body into the boat and started CPR as they motored towards the pier. 

The report continues: “The sea state was rough and they had difficulty bringing the boat alongside the pier. They were assisted at the pier by two other members of the public who had been called to the pier to help.”

In compiling the report, investigators established that the casualty was afloat alone in his motor boat in the one-hour period between 3.30pm and 4.30pm. 

“As the casualty was operating alone, it has not been possible to establish the exact circumstances leading up to this casualty event, therefore the most probable sequence of events are as follows,” reads the report.

“The casualty had successfully disembarked from the dinghy tender into the motor boat. There were minor items of work that could have been done on the vessel to prepare it for being removed from the water in two to three hours’ time.

“The casualty had started the vessel’s outboard engine. If the casualty’s intention was to motor over to the pier, then the next step in the process would have been to access the vessel’s bowline and untie it from the mooring buoy.”

However, the locked top-hung window indicates that he had not attempted to access the bowline in the standard manner. 

“Alternatively,” continues the report, “the casualty may have attempted to use the vessel’s boat hook to retrieve the bowline, which is likely to have required him to stand up and reach over the gunwhale to try and hook and then pull the bowline inboard.

“Accessing the bowline through the top-hung window would have had less of an effect on the stability of either the vessel or the casualty, than the somewhat awkward actions involved in standing up alongside the gunwhale and reaching over to hook and pull on the bowline, while taking account of wind and swell.”

Investigation Analysis and Recommendations

According to the MCIB report, the most likely explanation for the dinghy capsize is that it occurred when the casualty was attempting to climb out of the water after falling overboard from the motor boat.

The report outlines factors that contributed to the tragic outcome.

“Wind speed increased during the day to occasional force 6 and with strong gusts of up to 35 kts (65 km/h). A Small Craft Warning was in effect. These were challenging weather conditions in the circumstances.Cold water immersion was a further factor, with water temperature being 14°C.

Although the planned boat movement would have covered only a short distance, the absence of voyage planning was also cited as a factor. It is recommended that all voyages, regardless of their purpose, duration or distance, require some element of voyage planning. This includes checking weather forecasts and conditions, checking for hazards and risks, preparing a passage plan, having a means of communications, and making sure that someone ashore knows the plans for the trips and has a plan for what to do should they become concerned for the crews’ wellbeing.

Investigators noted that the casualty was not wearing a PFD at the time. According to the Code of Practice for the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft, a person going afloat in a recreational craft operated in Irish waters has statutory obligations in relation to the wearing of a PFD.

It was also found that he did not have emergency communication equipment such as a handheld marine VHF radio or a mobile phone in a waterproof pouch. Nor was he wearing a PLB which is a device designed to be carried or worn by an individual so that, when correctly activated in an emergency situation, the PLB transmits a signal that is detected by satellite systems and then reported to the emergency services.

A further contributing factor was that the casualty’s vessel was not fitted with a boarding ladder or an emergency ladder. There is no legal requirement for vessels of that age to be upgraded in line with more recent legislation. However, a boarding ladder is listed as a piece of lifesaving and personal safety equipment.

Another finding was that although the casualty had been around boats all his life, he had no formal powerboat training or certification. Such training would have given a greater understanding of the aforementioned factors. 

The MCIB acknowledges that the Code of Practice for the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft has no regulatory remit and simply provides safety information and guidelines. Training is therefore voluntary. 

It is suggested that there should be “some sort of regime that requires recreational craft users to have engaged in basic safety training and awareness, similar perhaps to the online preliminary driving test assessment.”

Further regulation of training and of the use of pleasure craft was also recommended, as are specific water safety awareness campaigns for pleasure craft users.